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Abstract
We characterize the class of group-strategyproof mechanisms for the single facility location
game in any unconstrained strictly convex space. A mechanism is group-strategyproof, if no
group of agents can misreport so that all its members are strictly better off. A strictly convex
space, is a normed vector space where ‖x + y‖ < 2 holds for any pair of different unit vectors
x 6= y, e.g., any Lp space with p ∈ (1,∞).
We show that any deterministic, unanimous, group-strategyproof mechanism must be dicta-
torial, and that any randomized, unanimous, translation-invariant, group-strategyproof mecha-
nism must be 2-dictatorial. Here a randomized mechanism is 2-dictatorial if the lottery output
of the mechanism must be distributed on the line segment between two dictators’ inputs. A
mechanism is translation-invariant if the output of the mechanism follows the same translation
of the input.
Our characterization directly implies that any (randomized) translation-invariant approx-
imation algorithm satisfying the group-strategyproofness property has a lower bound of 2-
approximation for maximum cost (whenever n ≥ 3), and n/2 − 1 for social cost. We also
find an algorithm that 2-approximates the maximum cost and n/2-approximates the social cost,
proving the bounds to be (almost) tight.
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1 Introduction
In a single facility location game of n agents, every agent reports a location, and an algorithm
(i.e., the mechanism) chooses a facility location (i.e., an alternative). The cost of each agent is the
distance between the facility location and her true location. A mechanism is strategyproof, if no
one can be better off by misreporting, i.e., the outcome of the mechanism cannot be closer even if
she reports a fake location. A mechanism is group-strategyproof, if no group of agents can jointly
misreport their inputs to the algorithm so that all members are strictly better off.
Characterization of truthful mechanisms for voting problems has received a great amount of
attention in the past few decades. Seminal results include Gibbard [G+77] that shows any strat-
egyproof mechanism that depends on individual strong orderings must be a probability mixture
of unilateral (i.e., only one agent can affect the outcome) or duple (restricting the deterministic
outcome between a fixed pair of alternatives) schemes.
Unfortunately, such characterization is generally hard to achieve in the restricted domains such
as single-peaked preferences (i.e., one-dimensional facility location game) and especially in the
higher-dimensional settings, however, they also provide possibilities for positive results. An impor-
tant breakthrough in this literature was made by Moulin [Mou80] — a complete characterization of
deterministic strategyproof mechanisms over one-dimensional single-peaked preferences — known
as the median voter schemes. Border and Jordan [BJ83] extend Moulin’s result to Euclidean
space and show that it induces to median voter schemes in each dimension separately. Barbera` et
al. [BGS93] further show that this separability generalizes to any L1-norm, known as generalized
median voter schemes. Some more restricted domains are also studied, e.g., a compact set of the
Euclidean space [BMS98], while typically showing that all those mechanisms behave like generalized
median voter schemes. However, there is no result about randomized mechanisms in such settings.
An approximation perspective of this problem was first introduced by Procaccia and Tennen-
holtz [PT09]. They study approximately optimal strategyproof mechanisms for facility games under
social cost (the sum of individual costs) and maximum cost (the maximum of individual costs) ob-
jectives while taking care of randomized mechanisms, but focus on the one-dimensional setting.
They propose an interesting randomized mechanism for the maximum cost objective, which 3/2-
approximates the optimum and proves to be the best, while also ensuring group-strategyproofness.
Many follow-up works are concerned with the approximation bounds of facility games on a line or
a network, including many facilities and non-linear costs (see e.g., [AFPT10, LSWZ10, EGT+11,
FT13, FW13, FT14, FFG16]). However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the previous works
studies randomized mechanisms in any multi-dimensional space — no characterization was estab-
lished, nor any approximation bound. In fact, Border and Jordan’s work [BJ83] implies that some
of those strategyproof mechanisms can indeed be generalized to the multi-dimensional domain and
preserve the property of strategyproofness. Unfortunately, they are no longer group-strategyproof,
which is the focus of this paper.
We study a fundamental aspect of this problem: single facility location, in an unconstrained
multi-dimensional strictly convex space. For example, Euclidean distance, or generally any Lp-
norm (p ∈ (1,∞)), after an arbitrary affine transformation, is strictly convex. The motivation of
studying strictly convex norms is not only that they are commonly used in the related literature,
and moreover, agents in a strictly convex space are more likely to manipulate and behave unlike
separable preferences established in the previous characterizations [BJ83, BGS93].
A special case of our setting — deterministic group-strategyproof mechanisms in the Euclidean
space — has long been investigated. Bordes et al. [BLLB11], originally presented as [BLLB90] 20
years earlier, show that any deterministic group-strategyproof mechanisms in the unconstrained
Euclidean space must be dictatorial. Their proof aims to characterize the option sets and utilizes
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many properties specified to the Euclidean distance, which seems hardly extendable to general
strictly convex norms. Our deterministic part can be regarded as a direct generalization of this
result but proved in a different and possibly cleaner way. Sui [Sui15] studies this setting in a
practical manner, showing that generalized median mechanisms are not group-strategyproof in
the unconstrained Euclidean space while the incentive of group misreport is unbounded. Yet, the
approximation bound or even possibility of group-strategyproofness with respect to any other norm
is still unknown, let alone randomized mechanisms. Disregarding algorithmic randomness partially
circumvents the computational complexity and usually comes with more restrictive results. In this
paper we show that randomized mechanisms can indeed implement more.
1.1 Our Results
We start by considering the deterministic case in Section 3, and our main theorem in this part
states as follow.
Theorem 1. If f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof, then f is dictatorial.
This characterization is actually complete, i.e., conversely, any dictatorial mechanism must be
deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof. Here a mechanism is unanimous if all agents
report the same point, the mechanism must choose that point as well. In fact, a mechanism that is
non-unanimous can be unbounded in terms of approximation under both social cost and maximum
cost objectives. Our approach in this part is a fundamental building block that introduces some
basic lemmas and intuitions for the characterization of randomized mechanisms.
For randomized mechanisms, we introduce a condition called translational invariance, which
says that if we apply a translation to the inputs, the mechanism must output a location that is the
result of the same translation to the original output. This condition is quite natural in the facility
location domain (also known as shift invariance in [FSY16] and position invariance in [FRLZZ17]),
and we indeed find some strange mechanisms (e.g., Mechanism 3) that are not translation-invariant
and related to some constant. Our main theorem states as follow.
Theorem 2. If f is unanimous, translation-invariant, and group-strategyproof, then f is 2-dictatorial.
A mechanism is 2-dictatorial, if the support of the output always lies on the segment between two
dictators’ inputs (the two dictators are called 2-dictators). Theorem 2 also indicates an impossibility
result with respect to the anonymity (Corollary 4.5). However, on the positive side, there is still
something to play between some two agents, and we present a non-trivial design in Mechanism 2.
Based on the characterizations above, we obtain lower bounds of approximately optimal mech-
anisms under both maximum and social cost objectives, summarized in Table 1. The upper bounds
for randomized mechanisms are guaranteed by Mechanism 2. All bounds are tight, except for the
little gap of randomized mechanisms for the social cost objective.
1.2 Our Techniques
We develop a series of technical tools to facilitate our characterizations. First, when some results
are obtained in the small-scale cases, we use scale reduction to generalize them over all n. Second,
we apply output space reduction to rule out some locations or randomized distributions that are
not preferred by any agent; typically, the output should be a convex combination over some agents’
inputs. Third, we establish a fundamental property called cost continuity, which is essential in our
proofs to generalize local properties over the whole space. Those techniques are detailed as follows.
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Deterministic Randomized
maximum cost
n = 2 [2, 2] [3/2a, 3/2]
n ≥ 3 [2, 2] [2b, 2]
social cost n ≥ 2 [n− 1, n− 1] [n/2− 1b, n/2]
Table 1: Summary of the approximation bounds of group-
strategyproof mechanisms in strictly convex space. n rep-
resents the number of agents.
a Proved by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [PT09] in the
one-dimensional case.
b Requires translational invariance.
1.2.1 Scale Reduction
For both characterizations, we begin with some small-scale cases (n = 2 for deterministic mecha-
nisms and n = 3 for randomized mechanisms), and then reduce general n-agent games into those
base cases. The intuition of the scale reduction is to bind some of the agents together to form a
temporary coalition, while the reduced game still preserves the required properties (e.g., group-
strategyproofness).
Our scale reduction in Theorem 1 is similarly used by Bordes et al.’s characterization [BLLB11].
Essentially, assuming that the statement holds for the base case (n = 2), we first divide the agents
into two groups and bind them respectively, one of which will be the dictator in the reduced 2-agent
game. Note that the dictator group forms some “partial unanimity” property, i.e., the unanimity
with respect a subset of agents. Then we can fix the location of an agent in the non-dictator group,
and the reduced (n−1)-agent game is still unanimous and group-strategyproof and thus dictatorial
by induction. It remains to show that all reduced games have the same dictator (see the proof of
Theorem 1 for details).
In Theorem 2, our scale reduction approach is substantially different. Using the base case
(n = 3), we can similarly divide the agents into three groups and two of them will be the 2-dictator
groups, however, we cannot simply fix the location of an agent since then the reduced game is
not necessarily translation-invariant. Here we use a different strategy: we fix an agent in the
non-dictator group to some other agent (i.e., bind them together) and reduce the game into n− 1
agents, but then we still need to show that the 2-dictatorship of this special game generalizes to
the whole space. This is still very complicated, and here we only point out our key observations:
we can utilize the “partial unanimity” with respect to the 2-dictator groups, as well as the “partial
unanimity” with respect to the fixed agent together with the 2-dictators in the special game. Note
that the intersection of those “partial unanimity” groups is exactly the 2-dictators, and those
“partial unanimity” can be further applied for output space reduction. See the proof of Theorem
2 for details.
1.2.2 Output Space Reduction
If we can find a location that is strictly preferred by everyone, then all agents can collaborate to
misreport that location, and thus group-strategyproofness is violated by unanimity. This is the
basic idea for output space reduction.
In the deterministic base case (n = 2), as long as the output does not lie on the line segment
between the two agents, we can always find such location by the strict convexity. This is exactly
what Lemma 3.5 establishes.
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For randomized mechanisms, we find the centroid (i.e., the expected location of a distribution)
very helpful to reduce the space of randomized distributions, as selecting the centroid of the out-
put does not make anyone worse off. This observation gives us a fundamental understanding of
randomized group-strategyproof mechanisms, as our Lemma 4.1 states. We rephrase this lemma
below in an informal way.
Lemma 1.1 (Informal version of Lemma 4.1). If the mechanism is unanimous and group-strategyproof,
then for any input preferences, the output of the mechanism is either deterministic, or a probability
mixture over the line segment between some two agents’ inputs.
1.2.3 Cost Continuity
Cost continuity is a fundamental local property of the output, which states informally as follow.
Lemma 1.2 (Informal version of Lemma 3.4, Cost continuity). If the mechanism is strategyproof,
then for any agent i, assuming that the inputs of all other agents are fixed, the expected distance
between the output and agent i’s location is a continuous function, and moreover, the distance
change cannot be larger than agent i’s movement (i.e., the function is 1-Lipschitz continuous).
Some previous work establishes the output continuity (stronger than cost continuity) for determin-
istic mechanisms [PvdSS93], but note that the continuity with respect to randomized distributions
is essentially different, and here we care about the cost function.
Cost continuity itself might not seems strong at first glance, but it turns out to be essential for
later proofs. By moving in small steps, we utilize the cost continuity to further prove other local
properties and successfully generalize them to the whole space. Lemma 4.2 especially makes the
case.
Lemma 1.3 (Informal version of Lemma 4.2). When n = 3, if the mechanism is unanimous and
group-strategyproof, then there exists an input profile such that the output is relatively very close to
an agent and isolated from another agent.
The formal version of this lemma is a pivot step of our final result. Cost continuity is used to
keep the output distribution staying on the base of an isosceles triangle, while slowly reshaping the
triangle to approach nearly a doubled line (and then the apex of the triangle will be the isolated
agent). If the output “jump” from the base to some leg, then its distance to some agent must not
be continuous and we further show the contradiction by moving some two agents simultaneously.
For more details, please refer to the formal statement and the proof.
Finally, we would like to remark that the cost continuity also holds for strategyproof mecha-
nisms, which shows its potential for future work.
1.3 Discussion and Open Problems
Our characterization of 2-dictatorship is almost complete, given the existence of non-dictatorial
mechanisms (e.g., Mechanism 2). However, one remaining problem is whether or not the distribu-
tion between the 2-dictators could be affected by the other agents. The answer of this question
would close the gap for the social cost objective.
In this paper, we focus on the strictly convex norms, which rule out L1 and L∞ space. Previous
work shows that generalized median voter schemes are strategyproof under L1-norm [BGS93], and
we suggest that they can moreover guarantee group-strategyproofness in a 2-dimensional L1 (or L∞,
after rotating the axes) space. However, they are no longer group-strategyproof if there are more
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than 2 dimensions. For example, suppose there are 5 agents located in a 3-dimensional L1 space
with coordinates (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), and the algorithm selects a median in
each dimension, making the output to be (1, 1, 1); then the first three agents can collaborate to
misreport (0, 0, 0), which would result in a strictly better output (0, 0, 0).
The most challenging generalization of this work would be deriving characterization of ran-
domized strategyproof mechanisms in multi-dimensional space. Among deterministic mechanisms,
much effort has been done to the generalized median voter schemes under different domains; given
such characterization, we suggest that selecting the median in each dimension can be approximately
efficient for social cost, but it also indicates that 2-approximation is already the tight bound for
maximum cost. Yet there is no known result about randomized mechanisms, even in an approxi-
mation view. We propose the following mechanism for better approximating the maximum cost.
Mechanism 1. Given x, output (x1 + · · · + xn)/n with 1/2 probability, and each xi with 1/2n
probability.
Mechanism 1 is strategyproof and (2−1/n)-approximation for maximum cost in any normed vector
space (see Appendix C.1 for the proof). Although 2−o(1) may not be a significant breakthrough, it
breaks the tight bound of deterministic mechanisms and provides positive implications. Further, the
characterization of randomized mechanisms would be completely different if taking away the group-
strategyproofness constraint, since some randomized strategyproof mechanisms such as Mechanism
1 can truly break the limit studied in this paper. Studying randomized strategyproof mechanisms
would be a more challenging but attractive task. We believe that our approach and techniques
could potentially lead the way for future algorithmic studies and further characterizations in this
fundamental setting.
2 Preliminaries
We consider the single facility location game with n (n ≥ 2) agents N = {1, . . . , n}. All agents
are located in a d-dimensional strictly convex space Rd (d ≥ 2), i.e., a normed vector space where
∀x, y ∈ Rd, x 6= y and ‖x‖ = ‖y‖ together imply ‖x‖+ ‖y‖ < ‖x+ y‖, or equivalently, the triangle
inequality ‖x + y‖ ≤ ‖x‖ + ‖y‖ holds with equality if and only if x, y are in the same direction.
Real number field is considered for simplicity. Let xi ∈ Rd be the location of agent i’s location. A
location profile is a vector of agents’ location, x = (x1, . . . , xn).
A deterministic mechanism is a function f : Rnd → Rd, mapping a location profile to the location
of facility. Given the location of facility f(x) = y ∈ Rd, the cost of agent i is the distance between
xi and y, i.e., ‖xi − y‖. We say f(x) is the output of x.
A randomized mechanism is a function mapping a location profile x ∈ Rnd to a probability
distribution over Rd. Given a probability distribution of facility f(x) = P , the cost of agent i is
the expected distance between xi and the facility, i.e.,
‖xi − P‖ , E
y∼P
‖xi − y‖.
In what follows, we formally define several constraints and/or properties of a mechanism, which
will be thoroughly discussed in the paper.
Definition 2.1 (Strategyproofness). A mechanism is strategyproof if and only if no agent can
gain from misreporting the location, that is, for all x ∈ Rnd , for all i ∈ N , and for all x′i ∈ Rd,
‖f(x)− xi‖ ≤ ‖f(x′i,x−i)− xi‖,
where x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) is the location profile without xi.
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Definition 2.2 (Group-strategyproofness). A mechanism is group-strategyproof if and only if for
all S ⊆ N , there is no x′S ∈ R|S|d such that all agents in S can gain from misreporting, that is, for
all x ∈ Rnd , for all S ⊆ N , for all x′S ∈ R|S|d , there exists i ∈ S such that
‖f(x)− xi‖ ≤ ‖f(x′S ,x−S)− xi‖,
where x−S is the location profile without agents in S.
Definition 2.3 (Unanimity). A mechanism f is unanimous if and only if
x1 = · · · = xn = x =⇒ f(x) = x.
That is, if all agents report the same point, the mechanism must choose that point as well.
Definition 2.4 (Translational invariance). A mechanism f is translation-invariant if and only if
∀x ∈ Rnd ,∀a ∈ Rd, f(x) + a = f(x+ a),
where x+ a = (x1 + a, . . . , xn + a). Namely, if we apply a translation to the inputs, the mechanism
must output a location that is the result of the same translation to the original output.
Definition 2.5 (Dictatorship). A mechanism f is dictatorial if and only if ∃i ∈ N , ∀x, f(x) = xi.
We say agent i is the dictator.
Definition 2.6 (2-Dictatorship). A mechanism f is 2-dictatorial if and only if ∃i, j ∈ N , ∀x, f(x)
lies on the segment between xi and xj. We say agents i and j are the 2-dictators.
We are also interested in designing a group-strategyproof mechanism while minimizing one of
the following common objectives — expected maximum cost or expected social cost, that is,
mc(P,x) = E
y∼P
[
max
i∈N
‖xi − y‖
]
,
or
sc(P,x) = E
y∼P
[∑
i∈N
‖xi − y‖
]
.
Also, we slightly abuse the notation, such that for y ∈ Rd, we use mc(y,x) and sc(y,x) to denote
the deterministic version of the objective functions. We say a mechanism is an α-approximation of
the optimum with respect to an objective obj if ∀x ∈ Rnd ,
obj(f(x),x) ≤ α min
y∈Rd
obj(y,x).
3 Deterministic Mechanisms
The trivial dictatorship mechanism is group-strategyproof, 2-approximation for maximum cost, and
(n− 1)-approximation for social cost. Unfortunately, we will show that this is the only possibility
of deterministic mechanisms, in any strictly convex space.
We start with a lemma which quickly follows by the definition of unanimity. (See the proof in
Appendix A.1.)
Lemma 3.1. All bounded-approximation mechanisms are unanimous.
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In some papers, they use onto as one of the constraints instead of unanimous (e.g., [SV02]). In
fact, these two constraints are equivalent when f is deterministic and strategyproof.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose f is deterministic and strategyproof, then f is unanimous if and only
if f is onto.
We give a short proof of this proposition in Appendix A.2. Given any output location, the idea
is simply to move every agent to the output location one by one and the output must stand still,
otherwise it would contradict strategyproofness.
Using the same manner, we obtain the uncompromising property, which is simple but useful.
A full proof can be found in Appendix A.3. The name of this property refers back to an earlier
paper [BJ83], which is meant to have a similar purpose.
Lemma 3.3 (Uncompromising property). Let f be a strategyproof mechanism. Let x be a profile
such that the output is deterministic, and let y = f(x). We claim that f(x′) = y, if either x′i = xi
or x′i = y holds for all i ∈ N .
Derived from strategyproofness, we then find a general property that characterizes the relation
between one’s movement and the cost. We will show that the (expected) distance from an agent
to the output cannot have a sudden change when an agent is moving slowly.
Lemma 3.4 (Cost continuity). Let f be a strategyproof mechanism. ∀i ∈ N , for any fixed x−i ∈
Rn−1d , the distance between xi and the output of (xi,x−i)
µ(xi) , ‖f(xi,x−i)− xi‖
is a continuous function. Moreover, ∀xi, x′i ∈ Rd,
‖µ(xi)− µ(x′i)‖ ≤ ‖xi − x′i‖.
Intuitively, whenever there is a sudden distance change, the agent can always gain by misreporting
the one with lower cost. In the proof, we first establish the 1-Lipschitz property, i.e., the distance
change cannot be larger than one’s movement. See Appendix A.4 for the detailed proof.
Then we begin with the base case where n = 2. The following lemma aims to reduce the output
space into a line segment between the two agents.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof. When n = 2, ∀x,
f(x) lies on x1x2
1.
Output space reduction plays an important role in our characterizations; this can be done by
considering the situation when all agents collaborate to misreport the same location, and then the
output must be that point as well by unanimity. Due to the strict convexity, as long as the output
does not lie on the segment, there exists such location where the group-strategyproofness can be
violated (see Appendix A.5 for the detailed proof). Later in Section 4, we will show that similar
idea also applies to randomized mechanisms.
Then we will give more insights into the domination of dictatorship — if it is dictatorial for
some profile, then it is dictatorial over all profiles.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof. When n = 2, if
there exist x1 6= x2 such that f(x) = x1, then agent 1 is the dictator in all profiles.
1For any x ∈ Rd, y ∈ Rd, we denote xy as the segment between x and y, that is, the set {ξx+(1− ξ)y | ξ ∈ [0, 1]}.
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In the proof (see Appendix A.6), we start with a weaker lemma, that is, by changing the location
of the other agent, the dictator remains the same. The intuition behind this lemma is simply to
move by steps, while preserving the only possible output to be the location of the dictator. Also,
the route requires at least two dimensions, so this statement is not true for the one-dimensional
setting (think that one can choose the leftmost as well as the rightmost point).
Now we are ready for the dictatorship in this special case.
Lemma 3.7. When n = 2, if f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof, then f is
dictatorial.
In the proof of this lemma, we actually show that the condition of Lemma 3.6 always holds with
respect to some agent, otherwise it would contradict the uncompromising property (see Appendix
A.7 for details).
Our theorem below generalizes this result for any n ≥ 2.
Theorem 1. If f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof, then f is dictatorial.
Intuitively, if we divide the agents into two groups where each group of agents shares a same
location, we may conclude that one of them is the group of dictators. We first show that there
exists a group of dictators containing n − 1 agents, and then reduce the n-agent game into an
(n − 1)-agent problem by fixing the location of the non-dictator. By induction, there should be a
dictator in the group, and finally we show that this dictator keeps to be the same agent regardless
of the location of the non-dictator. See Appendix A.8 for the detailed proof.
Theorem 1 also shows an impossibility result with respect to the anonymity — a commonly
used property in the literature, when the voters are unwilling to be identified.
Corollary 3.8. No deterministic, unanimous, group-strategyproof mechanism is anonymous.
4 Randomized Mechanisms
Compared with deterministic mechanisms, it seems that randomized mechanisms have more po-
tential to achieve better approximations. We first consider the following mechanism, which is a
variant of the prototype proposed by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [PT09]. In their one-dimensional
setting, a 3/2-approximation for maximum cost is guaranteed by randomly selecting the leftmost
point, the rightmost point, and the midpoint. However, this is unachievable in multi-dimensional
space and thus we simply use the locations of two fixed agents instead.
Mechanism 2. Given x, return x1 with 1/4 probability, x2 with 1/4 probability, and (x1 + x2)/2
with 1/2 probability.
When n = 2, Mechanism 2 is group-strategyproof and 3/2-approximation for maximum cost
(by a similar proof to [PT09]), but it reduces to a trivial 2-approximation for any n ≥ 3. For social
cost, it ensures an n/2-approximation (see Appendix C.2 for the proof), but finally we will show
that this is almost tight as well.
Under the deterministic setting, translational invariance is not used since dictatorship already
implies translational invariance. However, after we remove the deterministic constraint, there exist
some strange mechanisms which are not translation-invariant.
Mechanism 3. Given x, let r be the first coordinate of x1, and y be the point on x1x2 such that
‖x1 − y‖ = min{|r − a|, ‖x1 − x2‖}. Similarly, let y′ be the point on x1x3 such that ‖x1 − y′‖ =
min{|r − a|, ‖x1 − x3‖}.
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If r ≥ a, return x1 with 2/3 probability, and y with 1/3 probability. Otherwise, return x1 with
2/3 probability, and y′ with 1/3 probability.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: Illustration of Mechanism 3. Three possible cases are shown in the 2-dimensional Eu-
clidean space. The vertical lines stand for the points of which the first coordinate equals to a, and
the circles are of radius |r − a|.
For any fixed constant a, Mechanism 3 is unanimous and group-strategyproof (see Appendix
C.3 for the proof), but it is not translation-invariant. For example, supposing r ≥ a and r − a <
‖x1 − x2‖, when r increases, y gets more and more close to x2. Intuitively, if a mechanism is not
translation-invariant, it might be related to some constant (e.g., a in Mechanism 3), which is not a
desirable property.
For better illustration, we use the two notations below — centroid and radius of a distribution.
Let the centroid of a distribution P be
C(P ) = E
y∼P
y,
and the radius of P be
R(P ) = E
y∼P
‖y − C(P )‖ = ‖P − C(P )‖.
Generally, the output can be a distribution over the whole space. Our first lemma in this
section reduces every group-strategyproof and unanimous mechanism into distributions on the line
segments, derived from the convexity of the centroid.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose f is unanimous and group-strategyproof. ∀x, either R(f(x)) = 0 (that is,
the output is deterministic), or ∃i, j ∈ N such that the support of f(x) lies on the segment between
xi and xj.
Our intuition of this lemma is to consider the situation when all agents collaborate to misreport
the centroid. By the convexity of the centroid, no agent would be worse off after misreporting, but
strict preferences cannot hold in some cases. Specifically, if the support of the output forms a line
and some agent lies on the same line on one side, then misreporting the centroid is indifferent to
her. If there exists one such agent or multiple agents on the same side, then they can choose a
slightly closer location which they strictly prefers. For a full proof, see Appendix B.1.
It is also meaningful to think of what would happen if strong group-strategyproofness should
be guaranteed, i.e., no group of agents can jointly misreport their preferences so that at least one
member is strictly better off without making any member worse off. Following the idea of this
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lemma, strong group-strategyproofness could lead to a clear dictatorship even with randomness. If
f is supposed to be strong group-strategyproof instead, we can observe that (by a similar proof)
in the case of R(f(x)) > 0, x must be on a line, and f(x) is also on the same line, i.e., the output
must be deterministic as long as the agents are not on a line.
Lemma 4.1 reduces every randomized output to a line between some agents, however, the lines
are not necessarily formed by the same two agents and here our situation is still very complicated.
In what follows, we aim to characterize the base case where n = 3, f is unanimous and group-
strategyproof. The following lemma shows that under some conditions, the output can be relatively
very close to the input of some agent j and isolated from some agent i. This is a pivot step of our
final result.
Lemma 4.2. When n = 3, if f is unanimous and group-strategyproof, then ∀z ∈ Rd, ∀` > 0,
∃i ∈ N , ∀ > 0, there exists x such that
‖f(x)− xj‖ < ‖xi − xj‖ < `
holds for some j 6= i where ‖xj − z‖ < `.
To prove this lemma, we construct a sequence of profiles such that each profile forms an isosceles
triangle, while the output keeps on the base of the triangle. Moreover, we ensure that as the agents
move, the legs of the triangle get longer, while the base gets shorter. After that, we can easily find
a profile in the sequence such that ‖f(x)− xj‖ < ‖xi − xj‖, where xi is the apex of the triangle.
To make the output remains on the base, a clever application of the cost continuity is needed.
Intuitively, if the output jumps from the base to a leg, then the distance must not be continuous for
some agents. However, the distance only needs to be kept continuous with respect to the moving
agent, and this intuition should be further clarified. We designate two agents and try to move either
one at a time. If the output jumps when one agent moves and also when the other agent moves,
we show the contradiction by considering the situation where both agents move. For details, see
Appendix B.2.
In the following lemma, from a set of convergent profiles obtained above, we prove that as long
as some two agents share the same input, the output must be exactly their input. Intuitively,
starting from an appropriate profile, we can then move the isolated agent to anywhere we want by
steps, while keeping the output relatively very close to the fixed agent.
Lemma 4.3. Consider the case where n = 3, f is unanimous, translation-invariant, and group-
strategyproof. Then ∃i ∈ N , ∀z ∈ Rd, ∀x such that x−i = (z, . . . , z), f(x) = z.
Much care should be taken when moving randomized distributions. Essentially, we show that the
relative distance between the output and an agent may be amplified but bounded by a constant,
which actually decomposes into two more smaller lemmas in our proof (see Appendix B.3).
Note that this property just likes the unanimity if we disregard the isolated agent i. We can
then complete the special case where n = 3, following a similar proof to Lemma 3.5 (see Appendix
B.4 for details).
Lemma 4.4. When n = 3, if f is unanimous, translation-invariant, and group-strategyproof, then
f is 2-dictatorial.
Then we will generalize this result for any n ≥ 3.
Theorem 2. If f is unanimous, translation-invariant, and group-strategyproof, then f is 2-dictatorial.
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Similarly, we can divide the agents into three groups, among which two will be the groups of
2-dictators. However, here we cannot simply fix the location of an agent as done in Theorem
1, because then the reduced game would not be translation-invariant. Differently, by fixing the
location of a non-dictator to another agent (i.e., bind them together), we can then construct an
(n − 1)-agent game which is still unanimous, translation-invariant, and group-strategyproof, and
thus 2-dictatorial by the induction assumption. Leveraging some “partial unanimity” properties,
we finally show that the 2-dictatorship in the reduced mechanism extends to all profiles no matter
how the non-dictator locates. See Appendix B.5 for the proof.
Corollary 4.5. No unanimous, translation-invariant, group-strategyproof mechanism is anony-
mous, for any n ≥ 3.
Theorem 2 indicates that we can simply move the 2-dictators to one side away from the others,
where the lower bounds of approximately optimal mechanisms are obtained.
Corollary 4.6. For any n ≥ 3, no translation-invariant, group-strategyproof mechanism can do
better than 2-approximation for maximum cost.
Corollary 4.7. For any n ≥ 3, no translation-invariant, group-strategyproof mechanism can do
better than (n/2− 1)-approximation for social cost.
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Appendix A Deterministic Mechanisms
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Lemma 3.1. All bounded-approximation mechanisms are unanimous.
Proof. For any y ∈ Rd, consider the case where x1 = · · · = xn = y.
For both maximum cost and social cost,
mc(y,x) = sc(y,x) = 0,
so it must be
mc(f(x),x) = sc(f(x),x) = 0.
By the definition of mc(·) and sc(·), f(x) = y, that is, f is unanimous.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proposition 3.2. Suppose f is deterministic and strategyproof, then f is unanimous if and only
if f is onto.
Proof. If f is unanimous, ∀y, f(x) = y when x1 = · · · = xn = y, so f is onto.
If f is onto, then ∀y, there exists a profile x such that f(x) = y. For all i ∈ N , when we move xi
to y, because of strategyproofness, ‖f(y,x−i)− y‖ ≤ ‖f(x)− y‖ = 0, that is, f(y,x−i) = y. After
we move all agents to y (one by one), the output still stays unchanged, and thus f is unanimous.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Lemma 3.3 (Uncompromising property). Let f be a strategyproof mechanism. Let x be a profile
such that the output is deterministic, and let y = f(x). We claim that f(x′) = y, if either x′i = xi
or x′i = y holds for all i ∈ N .
Proof. ∀i ∈ N , we claim that f(y,x−i) = y, that is, if xi moves to the output, the output will not
change. If not, agent i would gain by misreporting xi instead of y. Formally,
‖f(y,x−i)− y‖ ≤ ‖f(x)− y‖ = 0.
By applying the claim above for multiple times, we can move multiple agents to y one by one,
while the output stands still. Therefore, f(x′) = y.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Lemma 3.4 (Cost continuity). Let f be a strategyproof mechanism. ∀i ∈ N , for any fixed x−i ∈
Rn−1d , the distance between xi and the output of (xi,x−i)
µ(xi) , ‖f(xi,x−i)− xi‖
is a continuous function. Moreover, ∀xi, x′i ∈ Rd,
‖µ(xi)− µ(x′i)‖ ≤ ‖xi − x′i‖.
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that ∃xi, x′i ∈ Rd such that ‖µ(xi)− µ(x′i)‖ > ‖xi − x′i‖. Without
loss of generality, assume µ(xi)− µ(x′i) > ‖xi − x′i‖. If agent i misreports x′i instead of xi, then
‖f(x′i,x−i)− xi‖ ≤ ‖f(x′i,x−i)− x′i‖+ ‖xi − x′i‖
= µ(x′i) + ‖xi − x′i‖
< µ(xi)
= ‖f(xi,x−i)− xi‖,
which disobeys strategyproofness. Therefore, ∀xi, x′i, ‖µ(xi)− µ(x′i)‖ ≤ ‖xi − x′i‖.
∀xi, let x′i → xi, then we obtain the continuity of µ at all points.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Lemma 3.5. Suppose f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof. When n = 2, ∀x,
f(x) lies on x1x2.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists x such that f(x) does not lie on
x1x2. Due to the strict convexity, f(x)− x1 and f(x)− x2 are not in the same direction and thus
the following triangle inequality holds strictly:
‖x1 − f(x)‖+ ‖f(x)− x2‖ > ‖x1 − x2‖.
However, ∀y ∈ x1x2,
‖x1 − y‖+ ‖y − x2‖ = ‖x1 − x2‖,
and thus we can easily find an y such that ‖y − x1‖ < ‖f(x) − x1‖ and ‖y − x2‖ < ‖f(x) − x2‖,
i.e., y is a strictly better choice for both agents. If both agents misreport y, then the output must
be y by unanimity, contradicting group-strategyproofness.
Lemma 3.5 indicates that the facility location is determined by the distance between the output
and an agent. Combined with the cost continuity, a corollary quickly follows.
Corollary A.1. When n = 2, if f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof, then f(x)
is a continuous function.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Lemma A.2. Suppose f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof. When n = 2, if
there exist x1 6= x2 such that f(x) = x1, then for all x′2, f(x1, x′2) = x1.
Proof. If x′2 = x1, by unanimity, f(x1, x′2) = x1.
Otherwise, by Lemma 3.5, f(x1, x
′
2) lies on the segment between x1 and x
′
2. Thus if ‖x′2−x2‖ <
‖x1−x2‖, then ‖f(x1, x′2)−x2‖ ≥ ‖f(x1, x2)−x2‖ if and only if f(x1, x′2) = x1, and we can obtain
that f(x1, x
′
2) = x1 by strategyproofness.
Now we only need to consider the case that ‖x′2−x2‖ ≥ ‖x1−x2‖. In this case, it is actually easy
to construct a sequence of points which starts with x2, ends with x
′
2, and for any two consecutive
points y and z, ‖z − y‖ < ‖x1 − y‖. E.g., first move agent 2 from x2 to the ray directed from x1
to x′2 while keeping the radius, then move straight to x′2 (see Figure 2). Then we can inductively
prove that for any point y in the sequence, f(x1, y) = x1. Finally, we obtain f(x1, x
′
2) = x1.
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Figure 2: Proof of Lemma A.2, shown in the Euclidean space. It shows a possible route that starts
from x2 and ends at x
′
2, while keeping the dictator agent 1 staying at the center x1.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof. When n = 2, if
there exist x1 6= x2 such that f(x) = x1, then agent 1 is the dictator in all profiles.
Proof. ∀x′ = (x′1, x′2), we prove f(x′) = x′1 by the following three steps.
1. Move agent 2 to xˆ2, such that xˆ2 6= x′1 and x′1 is on x1xˆ2. By Lemma A.2, f(x1, xˆ2) = x1.
2. Move agent 1 to x′1.
Suppose f(x′1, xˆ2) 6= x′1. ∀ξ ∈ [0, 1], let
µ(ξ) = ‖f(ξx1 + (1− ξ)x′1, xˆ2)− xˆ2‖.
Also we know that f(x′1, xˆ2) lies on x′1xˆ2 by Lemma 3.5, so
µ(0) = ‖f(x′1, xˆ2)− xˆ2‖ < ‖x′1 − xˆ2‖ ≤ ‖x1 − xˆ2‖ = µ(1).
Because µ is a continuous function (by Lemma 3.4), there exists ξ0 ∈ (0, 1] such that µ(ξ0) =
‖x′1 − xˆ2‖. Let y = ξ0x1 + (1− ξ0)x′1. We have ‖f(y, xˆ2)− xˆ2‖ = ‖x′1 − xˆ2‖, and y is on x′1xˆ2
(by Lemma 3.5), so f(y, xˆ2) = x
′
1. Consequently, agent 1 would misreport y instead of x
′
1,
contradicting strategyproofness. Thus, f(x′1, xˆ2) = x′1.
3. Move agent 2 from xˆ2 to x
′
2. By Lemma A.2, f(x
′) = x′1.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 3.7
Lemma 3.7. When n = 2, if f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof, then f is
dictatorial.
Proof. Let x be any profile such that x1 6= x2, and y = f(x). However, if y 6= x1 and y 6= x2, by
the uncompromising property, we obtain f(y, x2) = y. Therefore, by Lemma 3.6, agent 1 is the
dictator in all profiles, which contradicts y 6= x1.
Since either y = x1 or y = x2, f is dictatorial (by Lemma 3.6).
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A.8 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. If f is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof, then f is dictatorial.
Proof. We prove by induction on n. By Lemma 3.7, it holds when n = 2. Now we assume that
n ≥ 3, and assume it holds for n− 1.
First, we construct two new mechanisms g1, g2, where there are only two agents for each:
∀y = (y1, y2), let
g1(y1, y2) = f(y1, y2, . . . , y2),
g2(y1, y2) = f(y1, . . . , y1, y2).
In short, we bind the two groups of agents {2, . . . , n}, {1, . . . , n−1} respectively and then construct
g1, g2.
It is clear that g1, g2 are deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof, so g1, g2 are
dictatorial (by Lemma 3.7). If agent 1 (y1) is the dictator of g1, then agent 2 (y2) is not the
dictator of g2, because, by the uncompromising property,
f(y1, y2, . . . , y2) = y1 =⇒ f(y1, . . . , y1, y2) = y1.
Thus, either agent 2 is the dictator of g1, or agent 1 is the dictator of g2. Without loss of generality,
assume agent 2 is the dictator of g1.
We can then reduce the game into n−1 players. We construct a set of mechanisms, where there
are exactly n− 1 agents for each: ∀x1, ∀x−1, let
fx1(x−1) = f(x1,x−1).
It is clear that each reduced mechanism fx1 is deterministic and group-strategyproof, while its
unanimity comes from the dictatorship of g1. Therefore, ∀x1, fx1 is dictatorial (by the induction
assumption).
Then it suffices to show that all fx1 have a common dictator. Suppose for contradiction that
there exist x1, x
′
1 such that fx1 , fx′1 have different dictators. Without loss of generality, assume
agents 2, 3 are the dictators of fx1 , fx′1 , respectively. Consider the following profiles:
x = (x1, x
′
1, x1,x−{1,2,3}),
x′ = (x′1, x
′
1, x1,x−{1,2,3}),
where x−{1,2,3} can be arbitrary. In this case, agent 1 would misreport x′1 instead of truthfully
reporting x1, as f(x) = x
′
1 and f(x
′) = x1, which leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, there exists i ∈ {2, . . . , n} such that ∀x1, fx1 is dictatorial and agent i is the dictator.
That is, f is dictatorial.
Appendix B Randomized Mechanisms
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Lemma 4.1. Suppose f is unanimous and group-strategyproof. ∀x, either R(f(x)) = 0 (that is,
the output is deterministic), or ∃i, j ∈ N such that the support of f(x) lies on the segment between
xi and xj.
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Proof. Suppose R(f(x)) > 0 (i.e., the output is strictly randomized) and let y = C(f(x)). Accord-
ing to the group-strategyproofness, at least one agent cannot gain if all agents misreport the same
location y. That is, by unanimity, ∃i ∈ N such that
‖f(x)− xi‖ ≤ ‖y − xi‖. (1)
Let N1 be the set of agents satisfying inequality (1).
Due to the strict convexity, ∀i ∈ N , ‖f(x)−xi‖ ≥ ‖y−xi‖, and moreover, ‖f(x)−xi‖ = ‖y−xi‖
(i.e., i ∈ N1) if and only if the support of f(x) lies on a line with xi on the same side. Formally,
‖f(x)−xi‖ = ‖y−xi‖ if and only if there exists a unit vector e such that ∀y ∈ supp(f(x)), ∃c ≥ 0,
y = xi + c · e.
If all agents in N1 share the same unit vector e defined above, then we can find an  where
 < ‖f(x)− xj‖ − ‖y− xj‖ for all j ∈ N2, and  < ‖y− xi‖ for all i ∈ N1. Let y′ = y−  · e. Then,
∀j ∈ N2,
‖y′ − xj‖ ≤ ‖y′ − y‖+ ‖y − xj‖ = + ‖y − xj‖ < ‖f(x)− xj‖,
and ∀i ∈ N1,
‖y′ − xj‖ = ‖y − xj‖ −  = ‖f(x)− xi‖ −  < ‖f(x)− xi‖.
Thus, it violates group-strategyproofness if all agents collaborate to misreport y′.
Otherwise, there exist agents i, j ∈ N1 with two opposite unit vectors e and −e, which means
that the support of f(x) lies on the different sides to xi and xj on the same line, that is, the support
of f(x) lies on the segment between xi and xj .
Combined with Lemma 3.5 and the cost continuity, we can obtain some easy characterizations
of 2-agent games, as the following corollaries state.
Corollary B.1. When n = 2, if f is unanimous and group-strategyproof, then ∀x, f(x) lies on
x1x2.
Corollary B.2. When n = 2, if f is unanimous and group-strategyproof, then C(f(x1, x2)) is a
continuous function.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Lemma 4.2. When n = 3, if f is unanimous and group-strategyproof, then ∀z ∈ Rd, ∀` > 0,
∃i ∈ N , ∀ > 0, there exists x such that
‖f(x)− xj‖ < ‖xi − xj‖ < `
holds for some j 6= i where ‖xj − z‖ < `.
Proof. For any z and `, consider an equilateral triangle ∆x1x2x3 with edges of length `, such that
‖xi − z‖ < ` for i ∈ N . By Lemma 4.1, there are two cases: f(x1, x2, x3) is deterministic and
is in the triangle; or there exist i, j, such that f(x1, x2, x3) lies on xixj . For the first case, let
y = f(x1, x2, x3), without loss of generality, we assume x3 6= y. By the uncompromising property,
f(y, y, x3) = y. That is, the lemma is satisfied for i = 3. For the second case, without loss
of generality, we assume f(x1, x2, x3) lies on x1x2. Let x3 be the “xi” in the lemma. We will
construct a sequence of location profiles (x1, x2, x3) in the plane defined by the equilateral triangle
such that
(a) ∆x1x2x3 remains to be an isosceles triangle, with x3 be the apex;
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(b) in each iteration, x3 becomes further away from x1 and x2, or x1 and x2 get closer, i.e., either
‖x3 − x1‖ = ‖x3 − x2‖ increases, or ‖x1 − x2‖ decreases;
(c) ‖x1 − z‖ < `, ‖x2 − z‖ < `;
(d) ‖x3 − x1‖ = ‖x3 − x2‖ < `/.
(e) the output f(x) always lies on x1x2;
Particularly, in each round, we will find x′1, x′2, x′3, and inductively prove that ∃i ∈ N , the location
profile (x′i,x−i) satisfies the properties above.
For all δ1, δ2, δ3 (such that δ1 ≤ ‖x1 − x2‖ and δ2 ≤ ‖x1 − x2‖), we can easily find x′1, x′2, x′3
such that ‖x1 − x′1‖ = δ1, ‖x2 − x′2‖ = δ2, ‖x3 − x′3‖ = δ3, and ∀i ∈ N the location profile (x′i,x−i)
satisfies the property (a)-(c). For property (d), if ‖x3 − x1‖ = ‖x3 − x2‖ > `/2, then we already
have
min{‖f(x)− x1‖, ‖f(x)− x2‖} ≤ `/2 =  · `/2 < ‖x2 − x1‖.
Therefore, we can assume ‖x3 − x1‖ ≤ `/2, namely, if we set δ3 < `/2, property (d) is also
satisfied. For property (e), we first rule out the case where f(x′i,x−i) is deterministic and strictly
inside or outside the triangle, since in that case, we can move agents 1, 2 to the output and the
output remains the same by the uncompromising property, and thus the lemma is satisfied for any
. In what follows, we only consider the case that f(x′i,x−i) lies on some edge, and we will show
either one of (x′i,x−i) satisfies property (e), or f(x) is extremely close to x1 or x2.
Let P1 = f(x1, x2, x3), P2 = f(x1, x
′
2, x3), P3 = f(x1, x2, x
′
3), and P4 = f(x1, x
′
2, x
′
3). If P3
lies on x1x2, we are done. If not, without loss of generality, we assume that P3 lies on x2x′3.
Now consider P2, if P2 lies on x1x′2, we are done. Otherwise we consider the following two cases
separately:
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Proof of Lemma 4.2. Two possible cases are shown in the Euclidean space, where neither
P2 nor P3 stays on the same edge with P1.
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1. P2 lies on x′2x3 (see Figure 3(a)). Then we have
‖x′3 − P4‖ ≤ ‖x3 − P2‖+ δ3 (cost continuity)
= ‖x′2 − x3‖ − ‖x′2 − P2‖+ δ3
≤ ‖x′2 − x3‖ − ‖x2 − P1‖+ δ2 + δ3. (cost continuity)
Similarly,
‖x′2 − P4‖ ≤ ‖x2 − P3‖+ δ2 (cost continuity)
= ‖x2 − x′3‖ − ‖x′3 − P3‖+ δ2
≤ ‖x2 − x′3‖ − ‖x3 − P1‖+ δ2 + δ3. (cost continuity)
Adding two inequalities together,
‖x′2 − x′3‖ ≤ ‖x′3 − P4‖+ ‖x′2 − P4‖
≤ ‖x′2 − x3‖ − ‖x2 − P1‖+ ‖x2 − x′3‖ − ‖x3 − P1‖+ 2δ2 + 2δ3
≤ ‖x′2 − x′3‖+ ‖x2 − x3‖ − (‖x2 − P1‖+ ‖x3 − P1‖) + 3δ2 + 3δ3.
Let C1 = C(P1), then by convexity,
3δ2 + 3δ3 ≥ ‖x2 − P1‖+ ‖x3 − P1‖ − ‖x2 − x3‖ ≥ ‖x2 − C1‖+ ‖x3 − C1‖ − ‖x2 − x3‖. (2)
2. P2 lies on x1x3 (see Figure 3(b)). First by the cost continuity,
‖x2 − P2‖ ≤ ‖x′2 − P2‖+ δ2 ≤ ‖x2 − P1‖+ 2δ2. (3)
Let C2 = C(P2), then
‖x1 − P2‖+ ‖P2 − x2‖ ≥ ‖x1 − C2‖+ ‖C2 − x2‖ ≥ ‖x1 − x2‖ = ‖x1 − P1‖+ ‖x2 − P1‖.
Combined with (3), we have
‖x1 − P1‖ ≤ ‖x1 − P2‖+ 2δ2.
Also, by cost continuity,
‖x′3 − P4‖ ≤ ‖x3 − P2‖+ δ3.
On the other hand,
‖x′2 − P4‖ ≤ ‖x2 − P3‖+ δ2 (cost continuity)
= ‖x2 − x′3‖ − ‖x′3 − P3‖+ δ2
≤ ‖x2 − x′3‖ − ‖x3 − P1‖+ δ3 + δ2. (cost continuity)
Adding the three inequalities above,
‖x′2 − x′3‖ = ‖x′2 − P4‖+ ‖x′3 − P4‖
≤ ‖x2 − x′3‖ − ‖x3 − P1‖+ ‖x3 − P2‖+ ‖x1 − P2‖ − ‖x1 − P1‖+ 3δ2 + 2δ3
= ‖x2 − x′3‖ − ‖x3 − P1‖+ ‖x3 − x1‖ − ‖x1 − P1‖+ 3δ2 + 2δ3.
Let C1 = C(P1), then by convexity,
3δ2 + 2δ2 ≥ ‖x1 − P1‖+ ‖x3 − P1‖ − ‖x3 − x1‖ ≥ ‖x1 − C1‖+ ‖x3 − C1‖ − ‖x3 − x1‖. (4)
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One can observe the right hand sides of both (2) and (4) are in a form of
‖xk − C1‖+ ‖x3 − C1‖ − ‖xk − x3‖,
where k = 1, 2. By thinking the formula as a function of ‖x3 − C1‖, ‖xk − x3‖, ∠x3xkC1 and the
slope of xkx4, it is easy to see that for any α, there exists δ
′ > 0, such that when ‖xk −x3‖ ≤ `/2,
‖xk − C1‖ ≥ `/2 and ∠x3xkC1 ≥ α, ‖xk − C1‖+ ‖x3 − C1‖ − ‖xk − x3‖ is always lower bounded
by δ′. In that case, if we set both δ2 and δ3 to be δ′/10, the two possible cases are rejected, that is,
either P2 lies on x1x′2, or P3 lies on x1x2.
Note ‖xk−x3‖ ≤ `/2, ∠x3xkC1 ≥ α are always satisfied if α is set to be min{∠x3x1x2,∠x3x2x1}
at the beginning (because ∠x3xkC1 always increases). It suffices to consider the case ‖xk − C1‖ <
`/2. Let r = min{‖x2 − C1‖, ‖x1 − C1‖}. Then
R(P1) = E
y∼P1
‖y − C1‖ ≤ 2r.
If we move x1, x2 to C1, i.e., consider x
′ = (C1, C1, x3), then by group-strategyproofness we have
‖f(x′)− C1‖ ≤ ‖f(x)− C1‖ = ‖P1 − C1‖ = R(P1) ≤ 2r < ` ≤ ‖x3 − x1‖.
That is, we have already found the profile x′ satisfying the requirement of the lemma.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3
In order to prove Lemma 4.3, we introduce Lemma B.3 and Lemma B.4.
Lemma B.3. Suppose f is unanimous and group-strategyproof. When n = 2, ∀δ ≥ 0, if there exist
x1 6= x2 such that ‖f(x)− x1‖ ≤ δ, then for all x′2 where ‖x′2 − x2‖ < ‖x2 − x1‖,
‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖ ≤
δ
1− ‖x′2−x2‖‖x2−x1‖
.
Proof. Let r = ‖x2 − x1‖, d = ‖x′2 − x2‖. By Corollary B.1, f(x1, x′2) lies on x1x′2. ∀x ∈ [0, r], let
µ(x) =
∥∥∥x
r
x1 +
(
1− x
r
)
x′2 − x2
∥∥∥ .
Clearly, µ(0) = r, µ(r) = d. By the convexity of distance, ∀x ∈ [0, r],
µ(x) ≤
(
1− x
r
)
r +
x
r
· d = r −
(
1− d
r
)
x.
Thus, by strategyproofness,
r − δ ≤ ‖f(x1, x2)− x2‖
≤ ‖f(x1, x′2)− x2‖
= µ(‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖)
≤ r −
(
1− d
r
)
‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖,
and we can solve that
‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖ ≤
δ
1− dr
.
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Lemma B.4. Suppose f is unanimous and group-strategyproof. When n = 2, ∀δ ≥ 0, if there exist
x1 6= x2 such that ‖f(x)− x1‖ ≤ δ, then for all x′2 where ` ≥ r,
‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖ ≤
100`
r
δ.
Here, r = ‖x2 − x1‖, ` = ‖x′2 − x1‖.
Proof. The proof consists of two steps.
1. If r = `, then ‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖ ≤ 50δ.
We can move agent 2 from x2 to x
′
2 in several steps, while keeping the radius (i.e., distance
to x1) unchanged. Note that we are actually moving along a convex contour. If we move a
distance of at most r/8 at each step, then it can arrive within 32 steps (think of moving along
a square), and by Lemma B.3,
‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖ ≤
(
8
7
)32
δ ≤ 50δ.
2. If x2 lies on x1x′2, then ‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖ ≤ 2`δ/r.
From x2 straight to x
′
2, assume each time we move a distance of  times the distance between
x1 and the current location of agent 2. As → 0, by Lemma B.3,
‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖ ≤ δ(1− )−1−log1+
`
r → `
r
δ,
so there exists  such that ‖f(x1, x′2)− x1‖ ≤ 2`δ/r.
We can then obtain the statement for all x′2, by first applying step 1 and then applying step 2
(following a similar route to Figure 2).
Lemma 4.3. Consider the case where n = 3, f is unanimous, translation-invariant, and group-
strategyproof. Then ∃i ∈ N , ∀z ∈ Rd, ∀x such that x−i = (z, . . . , z), f(x) = z.
Proof. Let χ : Rd × R → N be a function such that χ(z, `) corresponds to the agent i chosen by
Lemma 4.2 with respect to the given z and `. Let Φ : Rd → 2N be a function mapping a location
to a subset of N , representing the convergence of χ(z, `) as ` → 0. Formally, ∀z ∈ Rd, ∀i ∈ N ,
i ∈ Φ(z) if and only if either there is an infinite number of m ∈ N+ such that χ(z, 1/m) = i, or
there exists xi 6= z such that f(xi,x−i) = z where x−i = (z, . . . , z). ∀i ∈ N , let Si = {z | i ∈ Φ(z)}.
Clearly, Φ(z) 6= ∅, and S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 = Rd. Specially, if f is translation-invariant, then χ(z, l) and
Φ(z) are invariant to z, so Si is either an empty set or exactly Rd. Now we suppose that Si = Rd.
If xi = z, then it holds by unanimity.
Otherwise, suppose f(x) 6= z. Let δ = min(‖f(x)− z‖, 1) > 0. By definition, ` can be infinitely
small while satisfying χ(z, `) = i. Let  = δ/200. Applying Lemma 4.2 with respect to any ` < δ/2
where χ(z, `) = i, there exists xˆ such that
‖f(xˆ)− xˆj‖ < ‖xˆi − xˆj‖ < δ
2
holds for some j 6= i where ‖xˆj − z‖ < δ/2.
Let z′ = xˆj . Now we move the agent other than i, j to z′ (coincides with agent j), and
these conditions still hold (by strategyproofness). Let x′ be the profile where x′i = xi and x
′
−i =
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(z′, . . . , z′). Because ‖xˆi − xˆj‖ < δ/2 < ‖xi − z′‖, we can apply Lemma B.4 by considering agent i
and the others as a two-player game, so ‖f(x′)− z′‖ ≤ δ/2,
‖f(x′)− z‖ ≤ ‖f(x′)− z′‖+ ‖z′ − z‖ < δ.
It leads to a contradiction, as agent i would misreport z′ instead of z.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Lemma 4.4. When n = 3, if f is unanimous, translation-invariant, and group-strategyproof, then
f is 2-dictatorial.
Proof. Let i be the agent chosen in Lemma 4.3, and let j, k be the other two agents. We claim that
agents j, k are the 2-dictators.
Assume for contradiction that there exists x such that f(x) does not lie on xjxk. Due to the
strict convexity, there exists y ∈ Rd such that ‖y− xj‖ < ‖f(x)− xj‖ and ‖y− xk‖ < ‖f(x)− xk‖.
Let x′ be the profile where x′i = xi and x
′
j = x
′
k = y. By Lemma 4.3, f(x
′) = y, so agents j and k
would collaborate to misreport y, contradicting group-strategyproofness.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. If f is unanimous, translation-invariant, and group-strategyproof, then f is 2-dictatorial.
Proof. We prove by induction on n. When n = 2, by Corollary B.1, the only two agents are the
2-dictators. Now we assume that n ≥ 3, and assume it holds for n− 1.
First, we divide all agents into three non-empty, nonintersecting groups S1, S2, S3, where S1 ∪
S2∪S3 = N . ∀y1, y2, y3 ∈ Rd, denote x(y1, y2, y3) as the profile where xi = y1 for all i ∈ S1, xj = y2
for all j ∈ S2, and xk = y3 for all k ∈ S3. We construct a mechanism g, where there are only three
agents: ∀y = (y1, y2, y3), let
g(y) = f(x(y1, y2, y3)).
In short, we bind the three groups of agents respectively and then construct g. It is clear that g
is unanimous, translation-invariant and group-strategyproof, so g is 2-dictatorial (by Lemma 4.4).
Without loss of generality, assume agents 2, 3 are the 2-dictators of g, and 1 ∈ S1.
Let FS denote the set of mechanisms derived from f when the locations of all agents in S are
fixed. Formally, ∀S ⊆ N ,
FS = {fxS | xS ∈ R|S|d },
where ∀x−S , fxS (x−S) = f(xS ,x−S). Note that every mechanism in FS is formed by n − |S|
agents, and is group-strategyproof as well as f . Similarly let F−S denote the set of mechanisms
when the locations of all agents not in S are fixed. Specially, F1 denotes the set of mechanisms
when the location of agent 1 is fixed, and moreover, every mechanism in F1 (as well as FS1) is
unanimous (by the 2-dictatorship of g together with the uncompromising property).
Let f1 denote the mechanism derived from f when the location of agent 1 is fixed to the location
of agent 2, i.e., ∀x−1,
f1(x−1) = f(x2,x−1).
It is clear that f1 is unanimous, translation-invariant, and group-strategyproof, and thus 2-dictatorial
by the induction assumption. We assume that agents 1, 2 (i.e., agents 2, 3 in f) are the 2-dictators
of f1. This assumption is without loss of generality since otherwise we can bind agent 1 to one
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of the 2-dictators instead of agent 2. By the 2-dictatorship of f1, as long as agents 1, 2, 3 in f
share the same location, the output must be that point as well, i.e., every mechanism in F−{1,2,3}
is unanimous.
Then we will generalize the 2-dictatorship of f1 to the whole space for arbitrary x1. Assume
for contradiction that f is not 2-dictatorial, i.e., ∃xˆ such that f(xˆ) does not lie on x2x3. Consider
the following two cases:
• ∃xˆ such that f(xˆ) does not lie on x2x3 and R(f(xˆ)) > 0. By Lemma 4.1, f(xˆ) lies on a
line segment between some agents. By the same argument as the proof of Lemma 4.1, there
exists x′ ∈ Rd on the same line with f(xˆ) such that ‖x′ − xi‖ < ‖f(xˆ) − xi‖ for all i ∈ S,
where S includes agents 2, 3 and all agents that are not on the same line with f(xˆ). Let xˆ′
denote the profile after moving all agents in S to x′ (then agents 2, . . . , n are on the same line
with f(xˆ)), which satisfies f(xˆ′) 6= x′ by group-strategyproofness. Since every mechanism in
F1 and F−{1,2,3} is unanimous and group-strategyproof, by Lemma 4.1, f(xˆ′) must both lie
on the same line with f(xˆ) and lie on x′x1. If x1 is not on the same line with f(xˆ), then it
directly follows that f(xˆ′) = x′ and leads to a contradiction. Even if x1 is on the same line
with f(xˆ), any f(xˆ′) 6= x′ would violate the continuity of the centroid (Corollary B.2), when
considering the two-player game formed by agent 1 and a group of agents 2, 3 while keeping
the other agents fixed.
• ∀x such that f(x) does not lie on x2x3, R(f(x)) = 0. We construct a two-player game formed
by agent 1 and a group of agents 2, 3 while keeping the other agents fixed: ∀x1, x2 ∈ Rd, let
fˆ(x1, x2) = f(x1, x2, x2, xˆ−{1,2,3}).
It is clear that fˆ is deterministic, unanimous, and group-strategyproof, and thus dictatorial
by Theorem 1. That is, as long as agents 2, 3 share the same location, the output must be
that point as well regardless of the location of agent 1. Now consider the two-player game
fxˆ−{2,3} formed by agents 2, 3: ∀x2, x3 ∈ Rd,
fxˆ−{2,3}(x2, x3) = f(xˆ1, x2, x3, xˆ−{1,2,3}).
Since fxˆ−{2,3} is unanimous and group-strategyproof, f(xˆ) must lie on x2x3 by Corollary B.1,
which makes a contradiction.
Therefore, f is 2-dictatorial.
Appendix C Proofs of Mechanisms
C.1 Strategyproofness and Approximation Bound of Mechanism 1
Mechanism 1. Given x, output (x1 + · · · + xn)/n with 1/2 probability, and each xi with 1/2n
probability.
Proposition C.1. Mechanism 1 is strategyproof.
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Proof. Since all agents are symmetric, it suffices to show that agent 1 cannot gain from misreporting.
∀x, ∀x′1 ∈ Rd,
‖f(x′1,x−1)− x1‖ =
1
2
∥∥∥∥x′1 +∑ni=2 xin − x1
∥∥∥∥+ 12n‖x′1 − x1‖+ 12n
n∑
i=2
‖xi − x1‖
≥ 1
2
∥∥∥∥∑ni=1 xin − x1
∥∥∥∥+ 12n
n∑
i=2
‖xi − x1‖
= ‖f(x)− x1‖.
Agent 1 cannot gain from misreporting, and thus Mechanism 1 is strategyproof.
Proposition C.2. Mechanism 1 is (2− 1/n)-approximation for maximum cost.
Proof. For any y1 6= y2, consider the following profile
x∗ = (y1, y2, . . . , y2).
In this case,
mc(f(x∗),x∗) =
n− 1
2n
‖y1 − y2‖+ 1
2
‖y1 − y2‖ =
(
1− 1
2n
)
‖y1 − y2‖,
while the optimal is mc((y1+y2)/2,x
∗) = ‖y1−y2‖/2, so the approximation ratio is at least 2−1/n.
Now we prove it to be the upper bound. Assume for contradiction that ∃x ∈ Rnd , ∃y ∈ Rd such
that
mc(f(x),x)
mc(y,x)
> 2− 1
n
.
Let r = mc(y,x). Let x = (x1 + · · ·+ xn)/n. Then,(
2− 1
n
)
r < mc(f(x),x) <
1
2
mc(x,x) + 1,
so there exists i ∈ N such that
‖xi − x‖ = mc(x,x) >
(
2− 2
n
)
r.
Also we have
‖xi − x‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n∑
j 6=i
xi − xj
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1n∑
j 6=i
‖xi − xj‖,
so there exists j ∈ N such that
‖xi − xj‖ ≥ n
n− 1‖xi − x‖ > 2r.
On the other hand,
‖xi − xj‖ ≤ ‖xi − y‖+ ‖xj − y‖ ≤ 2r,
which makes a contradiction.
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C.2 Approximation Bound of Mechanism 2
Mechanism 2. Given x, return x1 with 1/4 probability, x2 with 1/4 probability, and (x1 + x2)/2
with 1/2 probability.
Proposition C.3. Mechanism 2 is n/2-approximation for social cost.
Proof. For any y1 6= y2, consider the following profile
x∗ = (y1, y2, . . . , y2).
Because sc(f(x∗),x∗) = n2 ‖y1 − y2‖ and the optimal is sc(y1,x∗) = ‖y1 − y2‖, the approximation
ratio is at least n/2.
Now we prove it to be the upper bound. For any y ∈ Rd, assume y is the optimal location that
minimizes the social cost. Let d1 = ‖x1 − y‖, d2 = ‖x2 − y‖,
C =
n∑
i=3
‖xi − y‖.
Due to the convexity, ∀x,
sc(f(x),x) ≤ sc(x1,x) + sc(x2,x)
2
,
and
sc(f(x),x)
sc(y,x)
≤
1
2sc(x1,x) +
1
2sc(x2,x)
sc(y,x)
≤
1
2((n− 2)d1 + ‖x1 − x2‖+ C) + 12((n− 2)d2 + ‖x1 − x2‖+ C)
d1 + d2 + C
≤
n
2 (d1 + d2) + C
d1 + d2 + C
≤ n
2
.
As this inequality holds for all y ∈ Rd, we conclude that Mechanism 2 is exactly n/2-approximation
for social cost.
C.3 Group-Strategyproofness of Mechanism 3
Mechanism 3. Given x, let r be the first coordinate of x1, and y be the point on x1x2 such that
‖x1 − y‖ = min{|r − a|, ‖x1 − x2‖}. Similarly, let y′ be the point on x1x3 such that ‖x1 − y′‖ =
min{|r − a|, ‖x1 − x3‖}.
If r ≥ a, return x1 with 2/3 probability, and y with 1/3 probability. Otherwise, return x1 with
2/3 probability, and y′ with 1/3 probability.
Proposition C.4. Mechanism 3 is unanimous and group-strategyproof.
Proof. It suffices to show the group-strategyproofness for all r ≥ a, as the other case is symmetric.
In this case, the output lies on x1x2, and determined by x1 and x2. Thus, a group that
contains neither agent 1 nor agent 2 cannot violate group-strategyproofness. On the other hand,
a group that contains both of agents 1, 2 cannot violate group-strategyproofness either, because
‖x1 − f(x)‖+ ‖x2 − f(x)‖ = ‖x1 − x2‖ has already reached the minimum.
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Consider a group that contains agent 2 but not agent 1. If ‖x2 − x1‖ < r − a, then y = x2,
so agent 2 is truthful. Otherwise, let y′ be the “y” after misreporting, where ‖y′ − x1‖ ≤ r − a.
As a result, ‖x2 − y′‖ ≥ ‖x2 − x1‖ − (r − a) = ‖x2 − y‖. Therefore, this group cannot violate
group-strategyproofness.
Consider a group that contains agent 1 but not agent 2. Let y′ be the “y” after agent 1 misreports
x′1. Let d = ‖x1 − x′1‖, and r′ be the first coordinate of x′1. Then we have r′ − a ≥ r − a − d and
‖y′ − x′1‖ ≥ ‖y − x1‖ − d. Therefore, ‖y′ − x1‖ ≥ ‖y − x1‖ − 2d, and
‖f(x′)− x1‖ = 2
3
‖x′1 − x1‖+
1
3
‖y′ − x1‖
≥ 2
3
d+
1
3
(‖y − x1‖ − 2d)
=
‖y − x1‖
3
= ‖f(x)− x1‖.
Thus, this group cannot violate group-strategyproofness either.
The unanimity is clear, and thus Mechanism 3 is unanimous and group-strategyproof.
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